El Faro was often referred to in the media as a container ship. It is an easy mistake to make as the file photos showed her carrying stacks of containers on the main deck. El Faro, ex-Puerto Rico, ex-Northern Lights, was built as a roll-on roll-off ship in 1975 at Sun Shipbuilding. She underwent several refurbishments and as she carried containers on deck, might have been called a ro-con. Nevertheless, below decks, she was designed to carry wheeled vehicles. When she sank she was carrying 391 containers topside and 294 cars, trucks and trailers below deck. Why is this important? Tragically, it may help explain what happened to the ship and her crew.
Roll-on roll-off ships, or ro/ros, can be extremely efficient vessels. According to IMO, in 2004, more than 1.3 billion passengers, 188 million cars, 856,000 buses and 28.7 million trailers were carried on 5.9 million crossings globally and non-passenger carrying ro/ros. On the other hand, ro/ros have an inherent weakness which might have doomed El Faro.
Ro/ros have wide vehicle decks. They are essentially parking lots at sea. The wide and open decks are necessary for efficiently driving vehicles on and off the ships. The problem is that even moderate flooding of the vehicle deck can dramatically destabilize a ro/ro. The sloshing of the water on the vehicle deck, referred to as the “free surface effect,” can cause the ship to capsize rapidly and without warning.
In 1987, when a bow door was left open on the passenger ro/ro ferry Herald of Free Enterprize, water on the vehicle deck caused the ship to capsize in 90 seconds, not long after leaving the dock. 193 passengers and crew were lost. In 1994, the passenger ro/ro Estonia capsized and sank with more than 900 lives lost when the bow door was torn off by heavy seas. In 2004, the ro/ro car carrier Baltic Ace capsized and sank in 15 minutes following a collision with a container ship in the North Sea. Five crew were killed and six are missing and presumed dead. In 2006, a fire broke out on the Egyptian ro/ro passenger ferry al-Salam Boccaccio 98. Water from fighting the fire collected on the vehicle deck and caused the ship to capsize and sink with the loss of over 1,000 lives.
No one knows what happened to El Faro when she was caught in the path of Hurricane Joaquin. Based on the fates of other ro/ro ships over the years, it is possible that flooding on El Faro‘s ro/ro decks may have caused a sudden capsize of the ship as it drifted, blacked out, near the eye of a Category 4 hurricane.
While Joaquin was not yet a hurricane when El Faro left Jacksonville, is there a point at which the captain should have considered a change of course, and was that decision perhaps made later than it should have been? It’s hard to second-guess a vastly experienced captain who knew his ship very well, and at this point we are still very much hoping for a favorable outcome for the crew and are not wanting to blame anyone for what may be a tragedy, but I expect that any investigation will have to look at a time-line for decision-making about continuing the voyage on its path to Joaquin. At some point, it seems that the crew might have run out of options other than attempting to weather the storm. Do we have any idea of what it might have taken to have lost propulsion on El Faro. Also, if the second mate had sent a communication about being headed toward a hurricane, or if other crew had sent communications that the public doesn’t yet know about, those might be looked at very closely. If El Faro did indeed sink, her remains might tell much about her means of perishing.
Good question. According to some news reports, the ship was expected to pass well clear of the storm but then had a mechanical failure, lost propulsion and was caught in the path of the hurricane. There are problems with that version, but it or some variation on that account could have happened. Seems like horribly lax weather routing in any case.
I have been wondering as well about why the ship blacked out. My first thought would be some sort of fuel contamination, feedwater problems, or condenser issues. I am not a marine engineer, but there are quite a few ways to shut down a steam plant.
If there was flooding of the ro/ro decks, I suspect that she capsized before many could get out, or before boats could be lowered.
Rick,
Thank you for your well written piece. I can only hope that mainstream media will read it and learn a few things so they can ask intelligent questions and offer the best picture of what happened. As a professional mariner, I believe that you hit all of the key points that may have lead up to this tragedy. It is common for us to ask “Why did this had to happen?” and we often need appoint blame to specific person or persons to justify the loss of life. More often than not it is the captain who must bear the weight of the final decisions. Its unfair, but its comes with the position of Master. ‘Should we go now or go at all?’ ‘Should we turn around?’ or ‘should we or should we not abandon ship?’ these are the hardest decisions for a Master to make. To understand these questions, we need to see the entire picture of the marine industry. The drivers of both commercial commerce and of basic human need have to be understood. The EL FARO and her brave crew in essence fed the people Puerto Rico Everything from food to medicine, Walmart goods to car tires are what they brought to the island. This was their job and their calling. They sailed the vessel that fed an Island. However, knowing that this is a dangerous occupation their calling made them return to the ship storm after storm, year after year.
Where did they get the idea to sail on the day they left? Well, highly trained and experienced folks made decisions, using all of the tools available to them including voyage planning software, and meteorological tracking. The decision to toss all lines and proceed to sea has been done for many millennia. Its a decision that for good or bad it was made. Would one decide not to drive to a store if it was raining? If this decision isn’t mad then we don’t move forward. It is in no one’s best interests to just sail into a storm but storms happen at sea. The sea is unpredictable as is the weather. Sadly, EL FARO and her valiant crew were not able to handle this storm and a situation of this magnitude.
Finally, although I didn’t sail or train with these fine mariners, they will always be my brothers and sisters. I will always know that they are gone and I will miss them. Going to sea is what we do and it’s what they did. Its a life of great adventure and great risk. I have to believe that they died doing what they loved and tried their best save each other to the very end.
God bless them and their families.
Something that shouldn’t be related to the El Faro, but might come up in question, is the Jones Act and the MARAD routes to the non-contiguous states and possessions. Puerto Rico is hurting economically from the discontinuance of former tax advantages, plus high energy costs, plus the high shipping costs incurred by how the Jones Act affects Puerto Rico and other offshore locations of the US. I could see Puerto Ricans considering the argument that the way the Act is applied to them is wasteful not only economically, but, now, if the El Faro indeed turns out to be in fact a terrible tragedy, in lives as well. It’s not a strictly logical argument, but it could be seen as an opportunity for Puerto Rico and the other offshore possessions to bring awareness of the act’s unintended and not well known consequences outside the 48 contiguous states.
With their instability, perhaps SOLAS should require that ro-ros and container ships have gravity-drop lifeboats and the same sort of highly accessible lifeboat set-up the way tankers do. I’d at least like to see a discussion.
There is considerable controversy about the Jones Act focussed on both Puerto Rico and Hawaii.Business groups also complain about the cost of moving oil and products coastwise. It gets to be a complicated argument. Both sides have a valid case to make. The larger tragedy is that the US shipping industry has effectively collapsed and the Jone Act is one of the few surviving remnants.
Glad that you liked the post.
Strange because one news report said the main deck was a RO/RO.
It seems out of character that an experienced Captain would steam directly into the path of the storm as the message from the licensed officer to her mother states . No doubt that with the electronics on that ship the Captain had constant updates on the tropical storm/hurricane’s position , strength etc. Earlier this year Horizon Lines stopped it’s routes to Puerto Rico . It makes you wonder if the current problems with freight backlogs shipping to Puerto Rico may have contributed to the hell bent decision to make the run in the face of the storm . Purely speculation ? Maybe . However something caused a lapse in judgement in an otherwise prudent mariner and most likely caused his death and the deaths of the crew .
I think you will find at the enquiry that cargo on the vehicle decks broke loose from its securing causing a pile up on one side and the subsequent list.
Rick,
Both you and others have mentioned that the so called “masters decision” could have caused him to be disciplined or even dismissed for nor following “management pressure” on sailing and routing. Yet in another comment you state it is the Masters final responsibility.
Maritime Law places, correctly in my opinion, the final responsibility on the Master. Therefore vessel managers MUST be required to accept those decisions UNDER MARITIME LAW making it up to an Admiralty Court, Federal Court in the United States, to adjudicate a Master in Command.
Good Watch.
I agree the captain has the absolute legal authority. I also do not wish to suggest that TOTE management acted inappropriately. I have, however, seen the management of other shipping companies put significant pressure on masters when making the decision on whether or not to sail.
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ive sailed past El Faro several times when it was docked in Jacksonville and wondered why the hull had such huge holes in its sides not that far above the waterline. I concluded these were for natural ventilation for vehicle movements below deck. Towable barges on the PR run have similar vent holes. It seem logical that in severe/very severe weather these opening would take in huge amounts of water resulting in the flooding if the engine and generator rooms. Once power and propulsion are lost, the end is inevitable. Examine the hull closely and you will see the many slotted openings beneath to coamings.
I’m sure that the Captain had a plan that could not be followed once the engine failed. In addition, the storm took an unusual and unpredicted turn that might have been impossible to avoid once out there. Had the engine continued to function, she might have had a chance. The engine failure put her beam to the seas and the free water effect or the towering seas could have accentuated a list which caused below decks vehicles to break loose and cause her to capsize. She was in survival conditions with the engine running and without the engine she had nothing going for her. If one crew member had time to don a survival suit, perhaps some others did as well.
After the yphoon of 18 December 1944, Fleet Admiral Nimitz sent to the fleet a letter (http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/pacific-typhoon-18-december-1944/admiral-nimitzs-pacific-fleet-confidential-letter-on-lessons-of-damage-in-typhoon.html) reviewing that disastrous event. He concluded:
“Ships that keep on going as long as the severity of wind and sea has not yet come close to capsizing them or breaking them in two, may nevertheless become helpless to avoid these catastrophes later if things get worse. By then they may be unable to steer any heading but in the trough of the sea, or may have their steering control, lighting, communications, and main propulsion disabled, or may be helpless to secure things on deck or to jettison topside weights. The time for taking all measures for a ship’s safety is while still able to do so. Nothing is more dangerous than for a seaman to be grudging in taking precautions lest they turn out to have been unnecessary. Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy.”
I find it impossible to believe that the owners and master of El Faro were following Nimitz’s advice.
James Conner,
Excellent quote. This is the type of advice that my training was based on when I started as a pre-sea Cadet in 1953. It continued from 1954 through 1958 as a Deck Apprentice in Europe, after that it was up to me to apply it until I retired from seagoing in 2003. Overall it was called “seamanship” and was the result of hundreds of years of nautical knowledge passed on generation by generation. During this period shipping companies were operated under a Marine Superintendent who had held command at sea or been a Chief Engineer at sea.
How different today. People with no seagoing experience, one has only to look at the cruise lines, operate companies many of whom are not even interested in hearing the seagoing Officers opinions. There is little or no seamanship displayed and the results as we see once again are tragic.
It is hard to understand that while a junior Officer can text her concerns to her Mom her Captain is still steaming into the clear face of danger until the vessel has a blackout with fatal results.
Good Watch.
Couple of comments; Looks to me by the photos available that the lifeboats were Davited, Open..also seems they were located almost a deck too high which makes launching even more difficult when rolling.
These ships were originally on the Alaska run and had enough reserve power to make the tide into Anchorage. The target speed was 20 knots for the run, but with 30k HP they could bump that up. This allowed them to add the 90 feet later and still manage 20 knots. The rebuild/retrofit probably also allowed them to reinsure them since 25-30 years usually is the max.
Built in mid 70s ships had good form and meant for speed thus to take weather..the energy crisis slowed everyone down and scantlings.
With 300 containers on deck, the stow was not an issue to stability and they certainly will be able to review that data. Occasionally container weights are off but generally the crew figures this out with pre-departure drafts.
I believe loss of Power or Propulsion can be confusing. Propulsion Power in mechanical form means the running gear while Propulsion can be lost with a lost of Electrical Power.
There are a couple of vague comments that lead me to believe that there was an event that caused a breach in watertight integrity that was responsible for the loss of propulsion. In the Captain’s communication he said that they were taking on water [subsequent 15 degree list created and the stability issue] but it had been contained, and they had lost propulsion. The lack of communication details suggests that possibly the Emergency Switchboard may have been impacted. The 15 degree list suggests either a isolated compartment flooded [on one side] or that negative stability had been reached [meaning a compartment located to create that negative stability.] In either case a breach had occurred and that it probably caused the loss of propulsion.
While the issue of the Captain sailing into a hurricane seems horrifying, in a seaworthy vessel it happens often. The weather in Alaska is fast moving and bad, often and these ships have been tested. Normal procedures is to weather route around them, on a favorable side, etc. Many Ports will throw you out with a hurricane threat. Many Ports will deny entrance. Many times a ship can not outrun a hurricane or typhoon. If this was the main contributing factor, you would have seen a lot more sinkings before this. This vessel was class, inspected and intended for any ocean, any time.
This was an one event with about four elements of causation; Flooding, Propulsion, Stability, Weather, Damage occurring at the same time…the Perfect Failure.
Hopefully we will determine the facts [like why did the EPIRB just signal once? did it get fouled and go down with the ship??]
Is there a source of vessel tracking information that shows that the captain was following storm avoidance tactics and not just heading for the storm/direct route to PR before losing propulsion? Vessel Finder only shows El Faro leaving Jax. A timeline will be critical to an investigation. How would other experienced seafarers have tried to route around Joaquin? What minimum CPA would you be comfortable with as a separation from a projected cone of advance of such a powerful hurricane? Woukd you have called for help or bugged out sooner if evasion tactics weren’t working? Would you have calculated, “if we lose vessel propulsion or steerage now, how much time do we have before the vessel may be at risk ?” And if the answer was a very small number would you gave done something?
Anyone who has spent time in a steam plant knows that once you lose the plant it you cannot bring it back online right away. This especially true with a single shaft single main. I read correctly the El Faro is a single shaft. Most likely El Faro was dual boiler I don’t know maybe someone else does. But if you have split plant, single shaft and you pull or lose fires on both boilers you will be faced with securing the whole plant to save enough steam to light off as quick as possible. Otherwise you light off on air at a lower steam pressure making you wait to have full propulsion capabilities again. I have never understood why single shaft’s were designed in conjunction with steam propulsion. The dual shaft, 2 mains works better to prevent ship wide loss of power and propulsion You lose one boiler you only lose one main you lose vacuum on one condenser you only lose one boiler etc. From experience losing the plant in rough seas always seemed to be feedwater control or DFT related. I’m still confused as to what happened first the loss of propulsion or the list and flooding. I would assume at the time of transmission the ship was on Emergency diesel power.
While on assignment to SeaLand in the winter of 1985, I photographed the Tote vessel, ‘Northern Lights,’ docked in Anchorage, (with Denali looming above it.) I utilized a 4 x 5″ view camera, from a helicopter. Nothing ever came of the photograph, because the division president, in Seattle, was told by his public relations person, that he could accomplish such an image, albeit with a 35mm camera.
I can personally attest to the immediate catastrophic danger posed to such a vessel, if it loses power in such sea and weather conditions. I king crabbed in the Bering Sea, and it was reasonably normal to hear the weather briefing of 50+ mph winds. The Bering Sea is quite shallow, generally not more than 300′. Imagine a bathtub when you start moving the water a little. It doesn’t take much motion to agitate the whole mass of water. Crab vessels are constructed with a swimming pool-type space amidships. Water is constantly being pumped in to this tank to keep the crab alive until unloading to a processor or in port. Dead crabs at unloading are worthless. The tank is largely covered, with only a door-sized opening into which crabs are dumped. The water is constantly overflowing the tank, and flowing over the hull of the vessel, and overboard. When traveling, the tank lid is fastened on, and bolted down. If the vessel were to lose power, the immediate goal is to get the tank lid secured. Vessels without power turn broadside to the prevailing swells and wind, (usually from the same direction.) A boat, ‘in the trough,’ will experience water surging from side to side, beating the ship apart from the inside. So it is essential to close that hatch will it is brim full, avoiding the self destructive water effect. I remember asking our skipper, why do you run with both engines engaged. His response was cryptic and understandable, knowing the implications of losing power. He said, “If one engine stops, I know what the other one is doing.’ I presume, as alluded to, above, that some disabling calamity occurred putting out of commission both engines at the same time. What is more, I suppose this same emergency also compromised the auxiliary engines, which generate power for bilge pumps, basic electricity, and the like. Because of the gargantuan seas, (and I have experienced them–they are hard to believe, or even explain to others,) massive amounts of water could have entered the openings so low on the beam of the vessel, outstripping the capacity of the pumps to keep up. Furthermore, being so top heavy, AND being in the trough, the pendulum movement of the vessel would have been violently horrific. My guess is their doom followed within minutes of standing abreast of such swells.
When I was on the S/T Sierra Madre running to Alaska in the 90’s, the Tote ships would blast by us at 20 kts when we were down to 10 kts. They were strong ships. I guarantee that the loss of their engines is what doomed them. They had a 15 degree list and were rolling in a 50 ft sea. Once in the trough and rolling with that kind of list, it was just a matter of time before the ship would capsize. Especially if any cargo broke loose down below and having all the weight of the containers up high. I just renewed my master’s license in July and had to do the basic training safety course. Survival suit drill in a pool and firefighting in full gear on a three story training tower. I almost drowned in the pool trying to get in the raft when they made us put our suits on in the pool. If you have a suit full of water, good luck getting in a raft. I did a face plant getting in the raft with the help of a skinny strong guy in the raft ahead of me. It took me a few minutes just to catch my breath enough to get out of the way for the next victim to try to get in the raft. One can only imagine what it would be like in 50 ft seas and 150 kt winds. The lesson is to stay with the ship as long as possible. In this case, when it capsized, they had no time. One definition of going to sea comes to mind: “Hours and days of boredom, spiced with seconds of terror.” May they all rest in peace! My prayers are for the souls of the crew and their families. This is a sad, sad, reminder for us who go down to the sea in ships.
The 33 crew are all that I have thought about and the families , The El Faro was updated recently and I believe as able as any , it takes about 2 hrs to build steam from a cold start , she lost her way thru NO ONES FAULT AND HAD ONLY A WHEEL THAT WOULD NOT RESPOND , SHE RAN OUT OF TIME ,THE LIFE BOAT I SAW WAS BROKEN IN PIECES ,EITHER BY WAVES OR WHEN CAPSIZED ,NO ONE BELOW DECKS HAD TIME TO GET OUT.
TOTE MARINE HOULD SPLIT ALL THE INSURANCE SETTLEMENT INTO 33
BECAUSE THE EL FARO AND CREW GAVE IT EVERYTHING THEY HAD.
GOD BLESS, LORD MY BOAT IS SO SMALL AND YOUR OCEAN IS SO BIG.
I would love to read comments from other steam engineers. I have not sailed steam since the nineties but, remember quite often on a twin screw passenger ship; we had two boilers per engine room and usually only one in each engine room was operable. In other words, 2 out of 4 were typically down for maintenance. I do not know Sea Star’s customary practice. Would they have had both boilers on the line? Boiler failure seems like the most likely cause of loss of propulsion if they only had fires in one. You got 2 of every pump but, only one DC heater, Condenser, Turbine and Red Gear. The things you that you have “one of” have low probability of failure in my mind but, someone educate me. Thanks to you old salts.
Many thanks to Mr.Rick Spillman ,stating that “El Faro” was not a container vessel but a RO/RO,which should explain its sad disappearance,of which,I agree the media should have mentioned.
Congrats for your blog,which I shall now carefully consult.
ALL THE BEST!
This is all very interesting. However at end of the day the truth remains 33 sailors lost there life. Maybe not for all, but in that profession the ideology of a so to say “live by the gun die by the gun” has been adopted by sailors. If a recovery of human remains is possible than for the families sake I hope they can accomplish that. But if not than at least the final resting place for the 33 is the most honorable and commendable for their profession and peers. My best to the families and respect to the 33.
The reason why it is important that we attempt to understand the cause of the sinking of El Faro is precisely because the lives of 33 mariners were lost.
Too many things failed here:
1)A boiler was shut down and being repaired while Captain maintained course: hurricane bound. Forty foot seas will challenge any propulsion system, even if in good repair. There are trips on turbines and controls on boilers or diesel engines that don’t always fair well when the ship is being slammed by severe whether it should have been hundreds of miles away from.
2) Cargo Hatch (Scuttles) failed allowing free communication of seawater into the cargo hold.
3) GMDSS did not float free and send data when ship sank, even though ship is sitting “Upright” on the bottom right now. Why Not?
4) Inflatable liferafts should have been deployed. Even if they could not get to them, they should auto-deploy and inflate when ship sinks. Where were the rafts?
5) Third Mate e-mailed home telling family: “We are headed right for it.” This highlights the reckless course decisions made on the bridge, from Departure to ultimate power loss, hull breech and sinking.
-KMM (Merchant Marine, retired Chief Engineer with 35 years experience)
Does anyone have any theories on how the navigation bridge and the deck below separated from the hull? Sounds like she was slammed by a rogue wave. Why would three distress signals all sound at once.
Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/weather/hurricane/article43505154.html#storylink=cpy
Check out the following URL to get a detailed history of the RO-RO ships designed and built by Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, of which the SS EL FARO was one:
http://www.sunship.org/trailerships.html
During the period in which this class of ships were built I was a new construction Guarantee Engineer at Sun Ship, sailing on several of them during sea trials and then one or more voyages subsequent to delivery.
My thoughts on EL FARO’s sinking are that she was possibly unstable to begin with, considering the conditions under which she was then operating – at least what appears could possibly be the case going by recent photographs.
When constructed, these ships were designed to carry only RO-RO cargoes on all decks, including the uppermost, not containers stowed closely together and stacked three high. It seems to me that loading the uppermost deck in such a manner would tend to make for a more top heavy load, especially when the holds were loaded only with the less dense RO-RO cargo.
Of course, I don’t know if EL FARO was specifically modified to carry stacked containers on its uppermost open deck, possibly even to the inclusion of ballast, but I can’t help wondering if these things may have contributed to its sinking. If so, that would have made the ship very tender, possibly causing the containers on deck to shift during heavy rolling encountered in the seaway after having lost its plant and broaching to.
Thanks. Very interesting.
No comments from TOTE or any naval architects on John
MItchell’s posting??? What structural mods, ifany, were made to assure proper stability of the ship when containers are loaded (and even stacked) on the open deck which, incidentally, is one deck above the main watertight deck.?