On November 8, just after 4 AM, the Norwegian navy frigate, KNM Helge Ingstad, collided with the Maltese flag, Aframax tanker, Sola TS, near the Sture terminal in the Hjeltefjord near Bergen, Norway. The night was clear. Local traffic control and the tanker both communicated with the frigate by radio. The frigate’s radar and AIS receiver were operational and yet the frigate cut across the bow of the tanker, resulting in the collision. The tanker was traveling at around 6 knots, while the frigate was operating at 17-18 knots. Eight sailors aboard the frigate suffered minor injuries but the frigate subsequently sank.
What happened? The Accident Investigation Board Norway has issued a preliminary report answering at least some of the many questions surrounding the collision.
How could this have happened?
The simple answer is that the frigate did not recognize the tanker Sola TS as a ship. The watch officers on the KNM Helge Ingstad thought the object ahead was fixed, presumably part of the oil terminal. Instead, the two vessels were moving toward each other at around 23 knots. The more than 17-knot speed of the frigate also reduced the time available for the tanker and for traffic control to react.
Why didn’t the frigate identify the tanker?
The lights at the Sture terminal were bright in the early hours of the morning, making it harder to see other ships. As the frigate was approaching the terminal, the Sola TS was still alongside the dock and presumably blended in against the background. When the tanker got underway, it left its deck lights on, which probably meant that it continued to blend in and could have made it harder to see its running lights.
But, the frigate still had radar and AIS. There were at least three other ships in the channel just prior to the collision. Depending on the radar and AIS displays the Sola TS could have been overlooked.
What about radio communication?
The Helge Ingstad was not broadcasting its AIS position until shortly before the collision, which caused a delay in identifying the frigate by the local traffic control and the tanker. When the frigate was contacted by Sola TS and told to change course immediately, the captain of the frigate responded. The radio transcript is not clear but suggests that he thought that such a turn would send them either into traffic or towards the rocks. Apparently, he did not plan to change course until they passed the fixed object dead ahead, which was, in fact, the tanker Sola TS moving at them at 6 knots.
A video simulation of the collision:
Accident Norwegian frigate collision Helge Ingstad with oil tanker
Rick I have copied your account to another on this side of the Pond and received the following comments:
But what of the fully laden tanker, the pilot on board that vessel had a lot of concerns about the oncoming frigate … yet, your post giving ‘another take’, makes no reference to the fact that the tanker was accompanied by tugs, could have stopped – been held by said tugs, or indeed as I have mentioned before – despatched either a tug or pilot boat towards the oncoming frigate … and why did she not make the signal to advise of danger and/or that she did not understand the intentions of the oncoming frigate by sounding ship’s siren/horn giving five rapid short blasts etc etc.
Rick I conveyed your post to a colleague for comment who has come back with:
“But what of the fully laden tanker, the pilot on board that vessel had a lot of concerns about the oncoming frigate … yet, your post giving ‘another take’, makes no reference to the fact that the tanker was accompanied by tugs, could have stopped – been held by said tugs, or indeed as I have mentioned before – despatched either a tug or pilot boat towards the oncoming frigate … and why did she not make the signal to advise of danger and/or that she did not understand the intentions of the oncoming frigate by sounding ship’s siren/horn giving five rapid short blasts etc etc.”
A possible duplicate as my first did not appear.
I think the key point is that the frigate ran into the tanker. The tanker attempted to signal by radio, as well as by signal lights. When they finally did reach the frigate by radio, they directed the frigate to change course. The tanker also altered course in an attempt to avoid the frigate. The problem is that frigate was traveling at 17-18 knots, roughly three times the speed of the tanker, and was far more maneuverable. The tanker at 113,000 DWT had 20 times the mass of the frigate. The frigate could have avoided hitting the tanker, but the tanker had no possible way to avoid being run down by the frigate.
The fascinating thing I am finding out of this and the collision in Japan. Is how vulnerable the military vessels are to being rammed by the bulbous nose of the tankers. If a glancing blow is damaging this badly in peace time? What is going to happen if they are torpedoed or shot at? To be torn open so easily makes me wonder if the armor on these boats is even up to snuff!
At least by the public displays on offer it appears that Helge Ingstad‘s AIS did not come on until after the collision. or at least first appears with an increasing range from Sola TS hence post-collision. At best the warship’s AIS was switched on so close to the point of intercept that it was far too late to affect the tanker’s available choices.
It’s probably true that public sources don’t have the recorded update frequency available to investigators but that’s not relevant to this situation; 1 or even 2 minutes of time-resolution is enough to dismiss AIS as being useful to Sola TS in this circumstance.
AIS alone may not have been enough to avoid this conflict but the handling of the system is an indicator of some kind.
Navigating a ship without functioning AIS is like driving a car at night without headlights. There are only very peculiar extenuating circumstances for such a choice and this was not one of them. It’s more akin to the situation of drowning while only yards from a PFD in a locker; deeply humiliating even while instructive.
At Dover when a vessel first communicates with vts the vessels details are pinned to its mark on the coastguard’s plotter and follow it as it moves. This does not appear to be the case with Norway’s vts otherwise they would have been instantly aware of the name of the Navy ship when asked by the tanker. I wonder why this did not happen?
Also, if the Navy were supposedly monitoring the vts vhs channel why did they not comprehend that the tanker was now under way?
I await the final report with interest.
The VHF with English subtitles. Sobering.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYqGxbKF0AI