On New Year’s Eve, in 20-foot seas and high winds, the 130′ crab boat Scandies Rose operating off the Alaska Peninsula, developed a starboard list and suddenly capsized. Two of the seven crew were able to don exposure suits and were ultimately rescued. The remaining five crew are missing and presumed dead.
I was struck by the similarities between the loss of the Scandies Rose and the Arctic Rose, nineteen years ago. The two boats were very different. Scandies Rose was a crabber in the Gulf of Alaska, whereas the Arctic Rose was a trawler fishing for sole in the Bering Sea.
Like the Scandies Rose, the Arctic Rose capsized suddenly. Unlike the Scandies Rose, the Arctic Rose capsized so quickly that there was no time to even make a Mayday call. All fifteen aboard the Arctic Rose died. Only the captain, on the bridge, was able to get out and he succumbed to hypothermia before he could be rescued. The loss of the Arctic Rose is the most deadly commercial fishing accidents in US waters in more than 50 years.
It is too soon to know why the Scandies Rose capsized. For the Coast Guard and NTSB, the sinking of the Arctic Rose was a troubling mystery, that would not be solved until they launched a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) to search the wreck. The results of the investigation contributed to improved safety standards in the Alaskan fisheries. As evidenced by the recent loss of the Scandies Rose, there is still more work to be done.
This Sunday at 9PM, the Smithsonian Channel will air the documentary The Arctic Rose Mystery.
For the sake of full disclosure, I provide brief commentary in the documentary.
Icing, I’m thinking.
I’m acquainted with a marine architect here in Seattle, not so long ago retired. One of the reasons he finally burnt out was wrangling with fishing vessel owners over stability booklets. Obviously for fishermen there are sound reasons (leaving aside safety) to pile on more top hamper in various forms. A bigger crane, a few dozen more pots– all these things help make sometimes marginal economic situations more tenable. D. found himself constantly pushed to make error bars wider in the “right” direction, arguing with his clients over cross-purposes, eventually tired of it entirely.
Icing on the Scandies Rose is my guess as well.
I spent many years dealing with stability on cargo ships. Fishing vessels are another world entirely. Cargo ships, be they container ships, breakbulkers or tankers, load cargo in a safe port and batten down for sea. Fishing vessels leave without cargo and then load their cargo at sea, which from a stability point of view is nuts.
The USCG approved Stability Booklet on the Arctic Rose was so restrictive as to be totally useless, so it was completely ignored.